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It is clear from the implications of growth theory that the impact of aid depends on how
it affects savings, investment and government behaviour. In respect of low-income
countries, which are the principal aid recipients and the economies for which the issue
of the impact of aid on growth is most important, it is government that is most
important. This paper presents a review of studies that address the impact of aid on
government fiscal behaviour. In particular, the focus is on fungibility and fiscal
response studies. We argue that fungibility studies have been granted too much
attention; these are narrowly focussed on the composition of government spending, and
are not sufficiently informative about fiscal behaviour. Fiscal response studies are of
greater relevance, as they attempt to address the effects of aid on behaviour regarding
total spending, tax revenue and borrowing. Results show that the effects are complex
and varied, but that aid tends to be associated with government spending increases in
excess of the value of the aid, and can also have effects on tax effort and borrowing.
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1. Introduction
Perspectives on aid effectiveness have changed in recent years. At the theoretical level,
endogenous growth theory has provided a new means to analyze the aid-growth
relationship. Recent empirical work analyses the impact of aid on growth conditional on
other variables (notably indicators of economic policy) and the results, on balance,
suggest that aid is effective. However, the results appear sensitive to sample,
specification of conditioning variables and choice of instrumental variables (compare
Burnside and Dollar, 1997 to Hansen and Tarp, 2000a, b). In other words, results and
policy implications in the aid effectiveness literature are very sensitive to the
econometric approach used. It is essential to get the econometrics right if one is to be
confident that the correct policy inferences are being made. This is equally true in
respect of the literature on the fiscal effects of aid, which we address here.
The aim of this paper is to critically review the recent (mostly post-1990) theoretical
and empirical literature on the impact of aid on government fiscal behaviour—public
sector revenue and expenditure decisions. This literature is important on two grounds at
least. First, most aid, conventionally defined, goes to the public sector and any impact
on growth and poverty-reduction will be mediated by how this aid influences
government behaviour (on policy generally, and fiscal policy in particular). Second, for
many countries aid remains a principal source of revenue. For instance, aid inflows
were roughly equal in magnitude to taxation, and constituted approximately half of all
public expenditure, in low-income countries during the mid- to late-1990s (World Bank,
1996-99). It follows that any understanding of the broader impacts of aid, including
those on growth and poverty, must start with an understanding of its usage by this
sector. Is aid used for the purposes for which donors provided it? What are its impacts
on various categories of public sector expenditure, including investment (fixed and
human) and consumption? What are its impacts on revenue and financing decisions,
including those relating to taxation and borrowing? Does aid cause reductions in public
sector saving, and hence prolong a dependence on external financing?
A deficiency of the aid-growth literature is that it fails to explicitly recognize that aid is
given primarily to the government, and that hence any impact of aid on the economy
will be mediated by government behaviour. Although the literature recognizes the
importance of policy, the studies condition aid effectiveness on policy, rather than
examining how aid affects policy. The latter issue, in terms of fiscal policy, has been
addressed by two separate strands in the literature. First, studies of fungibility are
concerned with identifying whether aid that is intended (by donors) to be spent on a
particular expenditure item, such as health or education, is in fact allocated to that area.
This is often referred to as categorical fungibility as the issue is the allocation of aid to
expenditure categories and whether recipients allocate aid in the way donors intended
when granting the aid. Second, the fiscal response literature explicitly models how the
impact of aid is mediated by public sector behaviour. As such, these models are broader
in coverage, considering not only categorical allocation but also the effects of aid on tax
effort and public borrowing. We discuss both strands of the literature in turn.2
Table 1 Aid relative to government consumption, 1997 selected countries
Source Derived from various tables in World Development Report 1998/99
Note Data on tax revenue and government spending are very patchy, so GGC consumption is used.
In the source, general government consumption is expressed GDP whereas aid revenue is
expressed as a percentage of GNP. Using the ration of each country, the latter has been
converted to a percentage of GDP. For regional averages the ratio of total GDP to GNP is used
to convert average group Aid/GNP/GDP.
Table 1 presents some indicative data on the importance of aid relative to government
spending. For the selected countries, data on tax revenue or government spending as a
percentage of GDP were not readily available so we use data on general government
consumption (GGC). This will understate government spending. The aid data used are
not comprehensive, i.e. not all aid to the government is covered, and hence the aid/GDP
ratio may well be understated. Although the figures are not very accurate, they are
indicative (especially in relative terms). Unsurprisingly, for large countries such as
China and India, the aid/GDP and aid/GGC ratios are quite low. Similarly, the ratios
tend to be higher for low-income countries. In sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the aid/GGC
ratio is above 100% for highly aid-dependent economies, and is 30% on average. This
ratio is also around 30% in the poorer South Asian countries, and 12% in Pakistan. Even
in lower middle-income countries the aid/GGC ratio is over five per cent. This serves to
demonstrate that aid is a significant share of government revenue and spending,
especially in the poorest, aid-dependent countries.
￿￿￿￿ßœø ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿
￿￿￿￿ß￿œøł￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
India 10 0.62 6.20
Pakistan 12 1.46 12.17
Sri Lanka 11 3.53 32.09
￿￿￿ß￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿œ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
China 11 0.38 3.45
Indonesia 7 0.52 7.43
Philippines 13 1.07 8.23
￿￿￿ß￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿œ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿
Cote d’Ivoire 12 9.80 81.67
Ghana 10 10.19 101.90
Kenya 17 6.39 37.59
Senegal 10 12.63 126.30
Tanzania 13 15.37 118.23
Uganda 10 11.30 113.00
￿￿￿￿￿￿￿œ￿￿￿ ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿￿￿￿￿
Average (income groups)
Low-income 11 3.52 32.00
Lower-middle 13 0.74 5.69
Upper-middle 14 0.21 1.50
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Three main issues are addressed in this paper. The first concerns the theoretical and
empirical approaches used in the relevant literature. A variety of approaches have been
used, and the conclusions drawn are very sensitive to them. Different theoretical
frameworks, data sets, behavioural assumptions and econometric methods often provide
radically different results and hence different potential lessons and recommendations for
policy. The paper argues that some important caveats ought to be attached to the
approaches of, and results reported by, a number of studies. In particular, we contend
that the fiscal response literature, because it is broader in coverage, yields more reliable
and informative policy implications than the fungibility literature. The second issue
addressed by the paper concerns the results of these studies. What do these results tell us
about aid’s impact on the public sector aggregates? The third issue concerns the lessons
one can draw from these results about aid’s broader impacts, those for growth and
poverty alleviation in particular.
The paper divides the relevant literature into two groups of studies. Section 2 looks at
studies of how recipient governments allocate aid among specific categories of
expenditure, defined in terms of sector (agriculture, education, health, transport etc.).
This is labelled ‘categorical fungibility’ and refers to whether aid is allocated, either
wholly or partly, to the donor’s intended categories. The studies covered in Section 3
look at the relationship between aid and broader fiscal aggregates encompassing public
investment (capital expenditure), public consumption (recurrent expenditure), taxation
and other recurrent revenue and domestic borrowing. Put more simply, this literature
looks at the (broad) ‘fiscal response’ to aid inflows. Section 4 presents our conclusions,
and addresses briefly some broader issues and approaches not covered by the studies
that form the focus of this review.
2. Categorical fungibility studies
Aid is said to be fungible if the recipient uses (or has the ability to use) aid for purposes
other than those intended by the donors. This concept is well known, and we will not
discuss the various interpretations in any detail (for a critical review of the literature see
McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000a, b). In fact, as discussed below, much of the
literature is concerned with whether spending on sectors to which aid is directed
actually increases by the amount of the aid. For example, does spending on education
increase by the amount that donors allocate for education? This relates to the
composition of government spending. While this may be of valid concern to donors in
terms of how their aid is spent, it is hardly a burning issue regarding how aid affects
aggregate fiscal behaviour.
There are two reasons why we devote some attention to empirical studies of fungibility.
First, and perhaps foremost, these are the only types of studies referred to in the
discussion of the fiscal aspects of aid in World Bank (1998). In this sense, they have
been unduly influential in policy debates regarding aid. Second, general fungibility can
be quite important in terms of aid effectiveness. That is, if aid intended for investment is
actually diverted into government consumption spending, then the potential growth
impact of aid may be reduced. This assumes that government investment spending
makes a greater contribution to growth than government consumption spending, which
need not be the case. We return to this issue in the conclusion.4
2.1 Empirical approaches
The fundamental objective of the categorical fungibility studies is to detect the extent to
which aid in practice is used in a fungible manner. That is, they attempt to model the
actual extent to which aid, or some portion thereof, is used for purposes other than for
which it was intended. Categorical fungibility studies can be divided into two groups.
The first group includes Feyzioglu et al. (1998), Swaroop et al. (2000) and Khilji and
Zampelli (1991, 1994). Each of these studies derives, from a utility maximising
problem, and estimates a simultaneous linear expenditure system. The second group
adopts a more ad hoc approach, in that it is not based on an explicit theoretical
framework, but still estimates a set of simultaneous equations.
Probably the best known study belonging to the first group is Feyzioglu et al. (1998).
This study posits that the aid receiving government buys S public goods (g1, ..., gs)i n
the market to provide them for its citizens. It pays for these goods using the fungible
portion of aid, ￿ (0 £ ￿ £ 1), and revenue from all other domestic and international
sources, R. Citizens also consume goods that the government has to purchase with the
non-fungible portion, 1 - ￿, of aid. Aid is earmarked by donors for the purchase of
K (£ S) specific goods so that ￿k is the fungible portion of aid earmarked for good k.
Feyzioglu et al. define a representative agent’s utility function in terms of these S goods
and a single private good, cp, as follows:
where NF
k g (k =1 , … , K) is the quantity of the K-good that the government has to
purchase from the non-fungible portion of the aid earmarked for good k,a n dgs
(s=1 , … ,K, K+1,…,S) is the quantity of the sth good purchased from fungible aid
supplemented by other revenues. Feyzioglu et al. specify (1) in a Stone-Geary form as
follows:
where ￿s are positive subsistence quantities of the public goods and the ￿s sum to one.
The recipient government is thought to maximise (2) subject to the following constraint:
where ps are prices of the public goods, ak is aid for good k and R is revenue from all
other sources, both domestic and foreign. As ps, ￿k, R and ak a r ea s s u m e dt ob e
exogenous, the government chooses S goods (g1, g2, ..., gs) to maximise (2).
Maximizing (2) subject to the constraint, after some manipulation, yields the following
system of linear expenditure equations:
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where
This equation, supplemented with a vector of control variables (including, for example,
infant mortality rate and neighbouring country’s military expenditure) and similar
equations derived from variants of (1) and (2) (with a single variable - aggregate public
expenditure—and expenditure divided into current and capital expenditures,
respectively) are then estimated econometrically. Feyzioglu et al. (1998) estimated 36
equations using cross-country data, for 14 aid recipients for the period 1971-80.
Twenty-six of these equations were estimated individually using ordinary least squares
(OLS) and 10 jointly using the generalised methods of moments (GMM) technique.
Swaroop et al. (2000) followed a similar approach, estimating 20 equations individually
using OLS and four equations simultaneously using two-stage least squares (2SLS), but
using 1970-95 time series data for India. Khilji and Zampelli (1991) also used time
series data, but for 1960-86 US aid to Pakistan. Rather than estimating a relatively large
number of equations, this study estimated a single system, containing three equations,
using the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) approach. Khilji and Zampelli
(1994) followed the same approach but used cross-country data for eight aid recipients.
Results are discussed below.
Studies belonging to the second group looking at categorical fungibility include those
by Pack and Pack (1990, 1993), Cashell-Cordo and Craig (1990) and Gupta (1993).
Pack and Pack (1990, 1993), arguably the best known of these studies, assume that the
government under consideration (or a ‘collective decision making group’) possesses a
community indifference curve and is faced by a budget line. Various equations are then
posited which represent the demand curves derived from the corresponding optimising
decisions. In the case of the Dominican Republic (Pack and Pack, 1993) these equations
are:
where Di denotes various categories of public development expenditures, FI denotes
financial and indirect investment (including transfers to state enterprises), C denotes
total public current expenditure, R denotes total own source revenues (excluding aid),
GDP is current price gross domestic product, FAi is categorical foreign aid to
expendtiture category i, OFAi is foreign aid to other expenditure categories, FAT is total
foreign aid and DUM is a dummy variable capturing the presence of a structural
adjustment program. Note that development expenditures typically include expenditure
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(4)6
on such items as health and education, agriculture, infrastructure, and transport. Each of
the equations in (4) are linked by and must satisfy the following budget constraint:
where DEF is the size of the deficit (or surplus) and DS is debt service, which is
assumed to be exogenous. Recognising this link, and the joint determination of Di, FI,
C, FAi and R, Pack and Pack (1993) estimate equations (4) simultaneously using the
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) approach.
2.2 Results
A selection of results is shown in Table 2. Those reported by Pack and Pack (1990) for
Indonesia are quite encouraging. Taken on face value, aid to this country has entirely
been used for the purposes intended by donors. Aid seems to have caused increases in
domestic revenue, has not caused increases in non-developmental or (recurrent)
consumption expenditure, has caused a greater than proportional increase in both total
and developmental expenditure and has led to higher expenditure on health and
education. Gupta’s results for India are also reasonably encouraging. Although a one
unit increase in aid seems to lead to an uncomfortably large 0.73 unit increase in non-
developmental expenditure, the increase in development expenditure of 0.96 units is
greater; overall, total spending increases by significantly more than the amount of aid.
The remaining results shown in Table 2 are generally less than encouraging, again taken
on face value. Cashel-Cordo and Craig (1990) report surprisingly large aid-induced
incremental increases in domestic revenue and in the case of African countries a large
incremental increase in total expenditure. In contrast to Gupta (1993), Swaroop et al.
(2000) find that aid has no impact on revenue or on expenditure categories except non-
developmental expenditure, defined in this case to include spending on defense, interest
and general administrative services. Khilji and Zampelli (1991) and Pack and Pack
(1993), for Pakistan and the Dominican Republic respectively, find that aid is highly
fungible and has led to lower revenue in both countries. The extent of fungibility
reported by Feyzioglu et al. (1998) is puzzling, as it is negative. In Table 2 this is
simply the average of a number of statistically significant individual fungibility
parameters, each relating to various categories of government expenditure (see Table 7
of Feyzioglu et al.). These parameters range from -3.96 to 1.90 (encapsulating one
problem with their study—the highly heterogeneous nature of the countries included in
the sample).1 One would question how the extent of fungibility can be negative, or for
that matter greater than one. Surely the range should be between zero and one,
indicating zero and full fungibility respectively?
1 The main sample of 14 countries included such diverse economies as Bangladesh, Costa Rica, Egypt,
Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey and Zaire. Only five of the 14 are low-income.
DEF + FAT + R = DS + C + FI + D t t t t t t t i,78
Table 2 Results of selected categorical fungibility studies






















Indonesia 0.00 0.29 1.37 1.37 0.00 0.19 n.r. 0.00
Cashel-Cordo &
Craig (1990)








n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r.
Khilji & Zampelli
(1991)
Pakistan 1.00 -0.01 0.26 n.r. 0.74 n.r. n.r. n.r.





0.79 -0.39 -0.27 -0.05 -0.31 0.002 n.r. 0.08
Feyzioglu et al.
(1998)
14 LDCs -0.57 n.r. 0.95 0.23 n.r. 0.13 0.29 0.72
Swaroop et al.
(2000)
India n.r. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.00 0.00 n.r.
Notes: n.r: not reported (or cannot be inferred). a: African countries. b: non-African countries.9
Given the variation in results, there are few obvious conclusions from the fungibility
literature. Clearly, aid is used in a fungible manner, although one cannot make any
general comment regarding the extent of fungibility. Not only do the results vary (from
zero in Indonesia to complete fungibility in Pakistan) but it is also true that in none of
these studies is it known with any great precision how much aid was actually intended
to finance specific types of spending. As shown in Table 2, the studies also imply mixed
conclusions regarding the incremental impact of aid on spending: in some cases total
spending increases by more than the amount of aid, and often development spending
increases by more (or falls by less) than non-developmental spending. Some
unwarranted conclusions have been drawn, notably that fungibility ‘helps explain why
large amounts of aid have had no lasting effect in highly distorted environments’
(World Bank, 1998: 82). Aid ineffectiveness is as likely to be due to low productivity of
aid-financed investments as to aid being diverted to unintended uses. What the literature
does suggest is that donors would be rather naïve if they tried to target aid accurately to
specific expenditures, a point recognized in World Bank (1998). This does not mean
that donors cannot influence how aid is used, rather that the influence will be less than
complete (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000a).
Limitations of categorical fungibility studies
Empirical studies of categorical fungibility have been the basis of much of the recent
literature on the impact of aid on government spending behaviour. Indeed, these are the
only types of studies cited as evidence in World Bank (1998). Unfortunately, the
available studies are subject to a number of limitations. We concentrate on the two most
recent, and sophisticated, studies—Feyzioglu et al. (1998) and Swaroop et al. (2000).
Both are based on the same underlying theoretical model and although the country focus
differs are essentially similar in the empirical approach. We here highlight four major
concerns.
First, the model is based on two distinct types of expenditure headings: type-k to which
aid is allocated (some of which is non-fungible) and others to which no aid is allocated
(these are funded out of fungible aid and other revenue). The model of fungibility is
only strictly valid if these two types of expenditure are separable in the government’s
utility function. This requires that ‘aid affects the government’s choice [over all public
goods] only through the fungible portion; public goods purchased from the non-fungible
part do not affect this choice’ (Feyzioglu et al, 1998: 34). There is no reason for this to
be so. Governments will have some expectation regarding the total amount of aid they
will receive. They will also have a perception of the extent to which the aid can be used
in a fungible manner. It is reasonable to posit that aid receipts will potentially affect
expenditure allocations under all headings. One would wish to allow for the possibility
that, for example, if education is funded from non-fungible aid then spending on
defence can be higher than otherwise. Swaroop et al. (2000: 326) acknowledge this
problem in stating that the choice of the Stone-Geary utility function comes at a cost.
The second problem relates to the data, and tends to compound the first. It is necessary
to determine how much aid the donors intended should be spent on various headings.
World Bank data on concessionary loans is used for this purpose. This provides good
coverage for the Swaroop et al. (2000) study, but is less satisfactory for the10
heterogeneous set of countries in the Feyzioglu et al. (1998) study.2 As recipient
governments make the decisions being modelled, it is essential to use local data sources
to identify the aid received in the government budget. Swaroop et al. (2000) do use
Indian data on aid, but Feyzioglu et al. (1998) use a donor measure (the DAC data, or
alternatively a series constructed by the World Bank). The latter will not correspond
closely to the aid that goes through recipient public sector accounts.3 Some proportion
of DAC aid data, for instance, will include expenditure allocated entirely within donor
economies. The upshot is measurement error in the value of aid allocated to specific
headings (as would be perceived by the recipients). This is unlikely to have a significant
effect on the Swaroop et al. (2000) results, but casts doubt on the reliability of the
Feyzioglu et al. (1998) estimates (and may help to explain why so often they find
negative fungibility).
Third, as already mentioned, both studies rely heavily on the OLS method of estimation;
all of the Feyzioglu et al. (1998) results reported in Assessing Aid (World Bank, 1998)
are obtained using OLS. The use of OLS (and 2SLS) is questionable if the components
of total government spending are not determined independently of one another; in which
case the method yields inefficient estimates of the regression coefficients (that is, they
will not exhibit minimum variance) and the corresponding t ratios are biased. The
practical consequence of this is the possibility of erroneously not rejecting null
hypotheses relating to these coefficients. In reality one would tend to expect that
expenditure components would be determined jointly; indeed the budget constraint on
which these studies is based (equation (2) above) tells us that they are determined this
way and therefore one questions their results. More appropriate estimation methods in
this context are either FIML, SUR or three-stage least squares (3SLS), as have been
employed in other fiscal response or fungibility studies.
This criticism does not apply to Tables 7-9 in Feyzioglu et al. (1998), but the results in
these tables appear quite different. This highlights a general point that many results are
not robust (and, as shown in Table 2, are varied). The use of contemporaneous aid is
also unfortunate, as one might anticipate dynamic (or simply lagged) effects. Given the
measurement error in the sector aid variable, the slow process by which donors disburse
aid, and the many implementation problems that will occur in spending agencies (see
McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000b), it is perhaps not surprising that studies find a weak,
if any, correlation between sector aid and sector expenditure in any given year.
Fourth, and most importantly, these studies treat tax (and other non-aid) revenue as a
residual, and do not explicitly allow for the fact that aid can influence tax effort (and
2 See footnote 1. Furthermore, for many of the countries, especially the low-income ones,
concessionary loans are a relatively low share of total aid receipts.
3 Feyzioglu et al. (1998) could claim that they required a cross-section to draw general conclusions, and
so had to use a donor measure of aid. However, if the aid variable is an inaccurate measure of the
choice variable perceived by governments, one can question the relevance of the results as
information on government behaviour. In this context it is worth noting that most studies implicitly
assume that fungibility is an action by recipient governments (for a critique, see McGillivray and
Morrissey, 2000b).11
indeed borrowing). More generally, and related to the point above, no attempt is made
to estimate the impact of aid on the dynamics of spending in total or on specific sectors.
It may well be the case that in any given year expenditure outcomes by sector do not
correspond closely to aid allocations. If, over time, spending on the headings favoured
by donors do increase, then how much of a concern is fungibility? Unfortunately, the
studies do not address this directly. One may respond that fungibility studies are,
however, informative regarding the impact of aid on the composition of government
spending. This may be an important issue if donors are concerned with how aid is used,
although it is not at all clear that this is informative regarding the fiscal impact of aid.
The fundamental deficiency of the fungibility approach is that it pays insufficient
attention to the broader fiscal impacts of aid over time, especially on tax effort and
borrowing. In fact, as we have argued by citing the limitations, fungibility studies tell us
very little of relevance to fiscal impact. Furthermore, overt concern with fungibility may
serve to distract attention away from the more fundamental issue of how aid impacts on
recipient fiscal behaviour in general, including the interaction of expenditure and
revenue variables (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000a, b). To gain a deeper under-
standing of the fiscal impact, we consider the evidence from fiscal response models in
Section 3.
2.3 Policy implications
It is certainly true that there is compelling evidence of fungibility; recipients do, at least
in any given year, tend to allocate some aid for purposes not intended by donors. It is
less obvious that there are any valid policy implications. World Bank (1998) tends to
imply that fungibility is a result of ‘malicious’ intent by recipients, and that there is little
donors can do to prevent it. McGillivray and Morrissey (2000a) demonstrate that
fungibility is easily explained if donors and recipients simply have different preferences
regarding the allocation of public expenditure; ‘malicious’ intent is not required. This is
an important point, although it may appear minor. If recipients are only interested in
securing funding from donors, and have no intention of responding to donors’ wishes
(regarding aid allocation or policy reform)—malicious intent—then it is tautological
that fungibility will be exploited and conditionality will be limited if not ineffective.
This is probably the rare case. More commonly, recipients do want funds from donors
but are not totally averse to donors’ wishes or suggestions regarding policy and
expenditure. In general, preferences (on aid allocation and policy) differ and one should
not presume that one party (donor or recipient) is completely right. As Addison and
Murshed (2000) argue, donors may be fully justified in trying to prevent aid from being
used for military spending but otherwise are no better informed than recipients
regarding which components of expenditure are best for promoting growth or reducing
poverty. Thus the outcome (spending allocation) will be somewhere between the two
diverse positions, depending on respective bargaining powers and the ability of
recipients to effectively implement expenditure plans.
McGillivray and Morrissey (2000b) go further and argue that concern with fungibility is
misleading; the relevant issue is not fungibility per se but how aid affects fiscal
behaviour generally and how spending plans are implemented. They present an12
analytical framework in which there may be forms of ‘aid illusion’ such that officials
implementing expenditure plans misperceive the intentions of the policy officials who
set expenditure plans. All that is necessary for such misperceptions to arise is that
information flows and public expenditure management systems are weak, and there is
ample evidence for this in aid recipients (Fozzard and Foster, 2000). The principal aim
is to shed light on the empirical finding that aid leads to greater than proportional
increases in total public expenditure in recipient countries. Illustrative scenarios are
presented in which this finding results from misperceptions or illusions regarding either
the real or nominal value of the aid inflow, and the spending conditions attached.
Specifically, they show that even where the intention and conditions for fungibility are
present this does not necessarily imply that spending on the items donors want to
support will increase by less than the value of the aid. Conversely, they also illustrate a
case where there may be no intended fungibility yet spending on the items targeted by
donors decreases. In a nutshell, the argument is that preferences differ and
implementation is an imperfect process, therefore some fungibility may be observed,
but this in itself is not an important issue. What is important is the policy/expenditure
direction in which countries are moving, and whether aid can influence this.
3. Fiscal response models
Mosley et al. (1987) and Gang and Khan (1991), picking-up on an earlier paper by
Heller (1975) model the public sector fiscal response to foreign aid inflows. The Heller
(1975) approach is predicated on the observation that a basic task facing public sector
decision-makers in all countries is to allocate revenue among various expenditure
categories subject to budget constraints. To keep the exposition simple we can
distinguish two categories of public expenditure: recurrent expenditure or government
consumption (G) and capital expenditure or public sector investment (Ig). Government
revenue is obtained from domestic sources in the forms of taxation and other recurrent
revenue (T) and borrowing (B). In these models, aid (A) is treated as exogenous; aid is
an external source of revenue that enters the budget constraint. The utility function of
public sector decision-makers can be represented as:
) , , , ( B T G I U U g = (5)
Public sector policymakers are assumed to act in a rational, utility-maximising manner.
In the standard approach, contributors have assumed that governments set targets for
various expenditure headings and set revenue targets for tax and borrowing.
Governments maximize their utility by attaining these revenue and expenditure targets.
Following Mosley et al (1987) and Binh and McGillivray (1993), the utility function in
(5) can be represented as a quadratic loss function:
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where the asterisks denote exogenous target levels of the endogenous variables and
aI>0f o ri = 1, ..., 4. It is clear from (6) that government maximises its utility if it
achieves all targets, the maximum unconstrained value being a0.A l s o ,a sai >0t h e
principle of diminishing marginal utility is ensured for all levels of Ig, G, T and B.4
What the government now wants to do is maximize U subject to the budget constraint
that expenditures cannot exceed (all) revenues. In the standard Heller-type analysis the
utility function given by equation (6) is maximized subject to the following constraints:
B A T I g + - + - = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 2 1 r r (7)
A T G 2 1 r r + = (8)
where (1 - r1) represents savings from the recurrent budget and r2 represents the
proportion of aid allocated to consumption spending. Equations (7) and (8) are of course
a decomposition of the overall public sector budgetary constraint:
B A T G I g + + = + (9)
Standard fiscal response studies maximized (6) subject to (7) and (8). There are two
significant problems with this approach.5 The first is the interpretation given to r 2,
which is taken to represent the extent of fungibility of aid. In other words, it is implicitly
assumed that donors grant aid for investment purposes only (and that all investment
expenditures are captured in Ig) hence any aid allocated to G (proportion r 2)i sa nex
post measure of fungibility (i.e., r 2 =0ex ante). As there are elements of G which
donors would be willing to support, notably various social sector expenditures, r 2 >0
ex ante and the estimated value of r 2 is a measure of maximum fungibility.
The second problem is that this representation over-constrains the model, not
necessarily allowing the government to reach a0 even in the case where aid revenues are
sufficient to meet all targets. The problem arises because although total revenue may be
sufficient to meet (9), the a s constrain allocation so that specific expenditure targets in
(6) cannot be met. One possible solution is to use a single budget constraint like that in
4 Note that this utility function is symmetric, in the sense that utility is reduced in the same proportion
whether governments overshoot or undershoot a target. As Binh and McGillivray (1993) point out this
may appear restrictive if one believes that governments would be more concerned with undershooting
revenue targets than with overshooting. However, obtaining revenue has political costs, whether from
public objection to paying taxes or concern with aid dependency, whilst a revenue shortfall imposes
the political costs associated with a budget deficit (and/or the opportunity costs of reduced spending).
There is no reason, ap r i o r i , why a revenue shortfall generates more disutility than a revenue
overshoot. A similar argument applies to expenditures, as the opportunity cost of overspending is in
raising the revenue.
5 Note that (7) and (8) do not allow for the not uncommon practice in developing countries of financing
recurrent expenditure from domestic borrowing. This can easily be overcome by rewriting (7) with
(1-r3)B and adding r 3B to the left hand side of (8). McGillivray (1999) observes that failing to
account for this practice leads to misleading conclusions when attempting to model fiscal response.14
equation (9), which will always ensure that the model can attain a 0 when revenues are
sufficient to meet each target. This solution does, however, result in intuitively
unrealistic structural equations (McGillivray, 2000).
Gang and Khan (1991), unlike Mosley et al (1987) whose regressions were in the aid-
growth tradition, actually estimated the model, using time series data for India. This
work has stimulated a debate on the appropriate basis on which to model public sector
behaviour in the presence of aid inflows (Binh and McGillivray, 1993; Gang and Khan,
1993, 1994, 1999; McGillivray, 1999; Khan, 1994; White, 1994). Recent papers
endogenize aid (Franco-Rodriguez et al, 1998; McGillivray and Ahmed, 1999):
governments have a target for aid revenue, and this expected revenue is incorporated
into their fiscal planning. That is, when determining revenue and expenditure
allocations, anticipated aid revenue is taken into account. Making aid endogenous does
not require the assumption that recipients have control over the aid they are allocated by
donors; instead it requires that they have effective control over the amount that is
actually spent. The models with endogenous aid overcome many of the problems
inherent in the standard fiscal response models (those earlier papers with exogenous
aid). In Franco-Rodriguez et al (1998) the loss function (6) is replaced by:
() () ()()()
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The specification in (10) differs from standard fiscal response models by treating aid as
a choice variable for the recipient, and hence endogenous. The general justification for
treating aid as exogenous from the perspective of recipients is that the level is
determined by donors purely on the basis of supply-side criteria. In practice, however,
donors commit a certain amount of aid to recipients each year, and it is ultimately up to
recipients to determine how much of that commitment is disbursed (actually spent) in
the year. Recipients do have large degrees of choice over the amount disbursed, and
hence allocated among expenditure categories. Consequently, it is appropriate to treat
disbursed aid as an endogenous variable.
Given this reasoning, A is disbursements while the target A
* can be represented by
commitments. Under-spending an aid commitment in any given year is undesirable as it
implies an inability to utilise all aid (limited absorptive capacity) and may result in
decreased commitments in subsequent years. Overspending is also undesirable as, in
practice, if disbursements exceed commitments it means either delayed spending of past
commitments (suggesting limited absorptive capacity) or, more often, that emergency
aid was granted during the year (thus, it is a proxy for an adverse shock, such as
famine).
In principle, (10) is maximized subject to the constraints (7) and (8) with the attendant
problems outlined above. One possible option may be to maximize subject to (9).
However, (9) alone implies no constraints on how revenues are allocated thus implicitly
aid is completely fungible; this may not be a realistic representation of public sector
fiscal behaviour. Public sector fiscal decisions are subject to pressures from a number of
quarters: politicians, pressure groups and donors all seek to influence the allocation of
revenues (and electoral considerations will be important if democratic institutions are15
effective). These pressures are likely to culminate in outcomes which are sub-optimal in
terms of the government’s own preferences. Such constraints on public sector fiscal
behaviour can be incorporated by replacing (7) and (8) with:
B A T G 3 2 1 r r r + + £ (11)
The rationale for the inequality is that there are external constraints that limit the
manner in which the public sector in developing countries allocates revenues. The
actions of donors or domestic interests cause the values of the rs in (11) to be imposed
on those involved in setting targets and allocating revenue, with there being no
guarantee that targets can be met even though revenues may satisfy (9). In other words,
on the assumption that (11) is binding (the possible value of G is upper bound), these
external constraints prevent the attainment of a 0 (because at least one expenditure target
cannot be met). The analysis of Franco-Rodriguez et al (1998) is premised on this
assumption. If (11) is not binding the government is not prevented from reaching
specific expenditure targets, utility is maximised subject to (9) only and the government
can attain a 0 if revenues are sufficient.
In sum, the fiscal response model allows governments to set revenue and expenditure
targets, and to attempt to raise and allocate the revenues required to meet these targets
so as to maximize utility. Aid, like tax and borrowing, is treated as one of the forms of
revenue. If for some reason they fail to raise adequate revenue, for example a fall in
commodity prices reduces export tax revenue, then clearly utility is not maximised.
Similarly, if their discretion to allocate alternative revenues across different
expenditures is constrained, such that (11) is binding, utility will not be maximised
(more strictly, in both cases, there is constrained maximization and a 0 is not attained).
To analyse the impact of aid, in a model where governments expect to receive aid, one
can derive the structural equations from maximising (10) subject to (9) and (11),
assuming (11) to be binding, and then derive the reduced form equations. These can
then be estimated (and results are reported below).
It is worth noting that, at least conceptually, fiscal response models can be viewed as
encompassing categorical fungibility. In principle, if adequate data were available,
expenditure headings could be disaggregated in (10), with (11) becoming a set of
equations for different expenditures, and the rs in (11) would provide estimates of
(maximum) fungibility. In practice, this would place too great a demand on the data (in
fact, the nature of (11) implies that ideally one would use regime-switching models).
Fiscal response models, in effect, sacrifice the detail on categorical fungibility so as to
focus on the time series impact of aid on fiscal aggregates. As such models typically
distinguish investment (or development) from recurrent (or consumption or non-
development) expenditures, they do capture ‘general’ fungibility. In terms of aid
effectiveness, this general fungibility is more important than categorical fungibility
(which is most relevant to donor monitoring). But fiscal response models offer more as
they attempt to identify the impact of aid on tax and borrowing in addition to spending.
Such aggregate fiscal effects over time are likely to be important determinants of aid
effectiveness.16
3.1 Results and estimation problems
Heller (1975) estimated the fiscal response model using two-stage least squares (2SLS)
and cross-section data. This was appropriate to the extent that the equations contained
endogenous regressors. Subsequent applications use time series data and the more
efficient three-stage least squares (3SLS) method, which recognises cross-equation error
term correlations and accommodates the cross equation restrictions. On the other hand,
3SLS estimation can pose degrees of freedom problems by requiring more data points.
This is, of course, a tremendous problem for empirical research on developing countries
as time series are inevitably quite short (and of questionable quality). The shortness of
many time series also leads one to question seriously the results of a number of fiscal
response studies. This is the principal reason why, to date, there have been so few
attempts to estimate fiscal response models.
Many studies report estimates of structural equations only and base all conclusions
regarding the impact of aid on these estimates. However, the parameters of these
equations show direct effects only and ignore feedback effects operating within the
entire system of structural equations. Total (direct and indirect) effects are shown by
reduced form parameters obtained by solving the system for each endogenous variable.
Worse still, in some instances the impact of aid is judged purely on the basis of the
constraint equation parameters. White (1994) makes both points with respect to Gang
and Khan (1991) and McGillivray (1994) makes the second with respect to Khan and
Hoshino (1992). In both cases rather different interpretations of the impact of aid were
drawn, than in the original studies, given that the direct impacts were quite different to
the total impacts.
There are two other econometric problems with applications of Heller-type models. The
first concerns the estimates of the rs. Those reported by a number of studies are not
within the positive range of zero to unity. For example, Gang and Khan (1991) report a
r1 of 1.08 and Heller (1975) reports a r2 of -0.15 (although the estimate may not be
significantly different from zero). The interpretation given to a negative r is that it
indicates that the relevant revenue has pulled revenue from another category out of the
consumption budget. The interpretation given to a value greater than one is that the
corresponding revenue has pulled funds out of the investment budget. Yet these
interpretations would seem to be in error: one cannot allocate more than 100 percent of
a given revenue to some activity, nor can one allocate a negative proportion of some
revenue to a given activity. This is not to say that a category of revenue cannot pull
other funds away from another activity. For example, it is often the case that recipients
are required to supplement aid money with their own funds. But the effect of this on the
particular expenditure category would be observed from a combination of structural
parameters and not a single r. Of course, the studies would have not drawn such
interpretations had they in estimation sought to restrict the relevant parameters within
the range of zero and unity.
Arguably the greatest problem studies applying Heller-type models have faced concerns
the target variables. None of these studies have used actual values for these variables
due to the unavailability of data. Instead they have rather crudely estimated these
variables or, in the cases of Heller (1975) and Khan and Hoshino (1992), substituted17
equations representing them into the structural equations prior to estimation. Both
approaches are problematic. The second effectively treats the target equations as
identities, which is surely unrealistic. It essentially invokes an ‘errors in variables’
problem if the function fit obtained in estimating the targets is not one, and therefore
adversely effects the accuracy of the estimates of the structural equations. It also
requires the estimation of many more parameters and this can be problematic given the
typically limited number of time series observations available.
White (1994) criticizes the first approach on three general grounds. First, there is no
guarantee that the resulting targets will be consistent with the constraint equations.
Second, if the functional fits of the regressions used to obtain the targets is high and in
particular close to one, then each regressor in the structural equations estimation will in
effect be regressed on itself. The coefficient attached to each target will thus be either
one or close to one, and each other coefficient will be insignificant. Third, if these
functional fits are low, then it is difficult to meaningfully interpret the fitted values as
valid approximations of the targets. White (1994) makes a fourth point specifically with
reference to Gang and Khan (1994), but which also applies to a number of other studies.
A number of the target equations contain lagged dependent variables. This introduces an
implicit dynamic element into Gang and Khan (1994) which is suppressed in estimation.
Table 3 Selected results of fiscal response studies
Incremental impact of aid on
Study Sample TI gG B
Heller (1975) Cross-section (Africa) -0.4 1.1 -0.1
Gang & Khan
(1991)
India 0.0 0.0 0.0
Khan & Hoshino
(1992)
Cross-section (Asia) 1.2 1.2 0.3






























Notes: Figures are the total effect (incremental impact) of a unit of aid on public investment, public
consumption spending, tax revenue and, where reported, borrowing (measured in the same
units). Sources as indicated. We can note that Iqbal (1997) had a very short time series.
Franco-Rodriguez et al. (1998) try to address some of these problems in their study of
Pakistan, using data for 1956-95. In terms of the estimates for the rs in (11), the results
suggest that both aid and borrowing are allocated fairly evenly (about 50-50) between
consumption and investment, whereas only some 15 per cent of tax revenue is allocated
to investment. The direct effects of aid (inferred from the coefficients in the structural
equations) suggest that the reduction in G more than offsets the reduction in tax
revenue, so that less borrowing is needed. However, when the overall effects of aid are
traced through the fiscal response model (by interpreting the reduced form coefficients),
it appears that aid induces a slight overall increase in investment but a significant18
decrease in tax revenues that is more than offset by reduced consumption expenditures.
Increased borrowing is needed to compensate for the loss of tax revenue (Table 3). In
the case of Pakistan, therefore, aid seems to increase investment, but to encourage
reduced tax effort and greater borrowing.
Table 3 reports selected results from a number of fiscal response studies. We are
inclined to attach greater weight to the findings of the last three studies cited as they use
the model based on (10) and (11), have longer time series data and report full results for
the incremental impact of aid. Aid does appear to discourage tax effort, although this is
only clearly so for Pakistan and is not the case for Costa Rica. The evidence that aid is
primarily spent on consumption rather than investment (an implication of fungibility
studies) is not compelling, although there is little encouraging evidence that aid induces
significant increases in investment spending. In Pakistan, the incremental impact on
investment is positive and the significant reduction in tax effort seems to bear on
consumption spending (and borrowing needs). In Costa Rica, and to a lesser extent the
Philippines, investment spending falls and the increased tax effort seems to be used to
fund consumption spending and a reduction in borrowing.
We can not draw general conclusions from so few studies of fiscal response. However,
we can make some observations, emphasizing that these studies focus on the
incremental impact of aid (incorporating the time dimension). First, the evidence from
fiscal response models does not lend clear support to the more limited fungibility
studies. It is not evident that aid increases consumption spending by more than it
increases investment spending although, of the more robust studies, this is true for Costa
Rica and the Philippines but not for Pakistan. Second, fiscal response models highlight
that aid can have important effects on tax revenue, and the tendency is that tax effort is
reduced. We consider the implications of this below. It may be that the expectation of
aid reduces the incentive for governments to raise tax revenue. It may also be that aid is
associated with policy reforms (such as trade liberalisation) that reduce tax revenue
(tariff reductions). Third, there is evidence that aid has effects on borrowing; aid is
associated with reductions in borrowing in Costa Rica and the Philippines, but with
increased borrowing in Pakistan. In these models borrowing is effectively a residual,
and the implications of this result are explored in some detail below. Finally, it is
evident that the impact of aid varies by country. At the least, this cautions against
attaching too much weight to cross-country studies. Fundamentally, it suggests the need
for more time series country studies.
Limitations of fiscal response
Fiscal response models are no panacea, and many of the inherent problems have already
been referred to. They are notoriously difficult to estimate, and highly sensitive to (and
demanding of) the quality of the data. Frequently, as identified above, studies yield
inconsistent estimates of r’s and rarely can the underlying a’s be recovered (Franco-
Rodriguez, 2000, provides a critical discussion). One inherent empirical problem is that
it is necessary to estimate the targets, but there is no accepted theory regarding how
governments form revenue and expenditure targets. Persson and Tabellini (2000)
provide a range of contending models applicable to multi-party democracies, and there
is no solid basis to accept any one (although none are actually inconsistent with the loss19
function representation provided above). In an ideal world it may be possible to trawl
government plans and budgets to obtain stated targets, but in practice this is not possible
and target values are estimated econometrically (normally using actual values in some
way). Another problem is that the structural equations are typically estimated using non-
linear least squares, which is not very robust. A third problem lies in the theoretical
framework: a loss function such as (6) may not be a good representation of government
behaviour (and is not directly derived from a utility optimizing framework). This latter
problem is exacerbated as the targets are often estimated in an ad hoc manner.
Perhaps the most important problem, and probably also the most insoluble, is that the
behavioural relationship being estimated is assumed fixed over the period. In practice,
we would expect the impact of aid on fiscal behaviour to change over time. Indeed, the
rationale for attaching policy reform conditions to aid is to alter behavioural responses.
Addison and Osei (2000) provide evidence of a fiscal-electoral cycle emerging in
Ghana; to the extent that a country ‘democratizes’ during the period of study, one
should anticipate a change in the behavioural response to aid. In estimating an impulse
response function for Ghana, Osei (2001) finds that aid is associated with a reduction in
domestic borrowing, consistent with donor admonitions for stricter fiscal management.
In econometric terms, one would expect structural breaks in many, if not all, of the
series in the simultaneous equation framework. Furthermore, the way in which series
co-move will change. However, given the problems inherent in estimating fiscal
response identified above, it would not be possible to address these problems.
A final general problem, in the context of the aid-growth literature mentioned in the
Introduction, is that the fiscal response models do not relate aid and fiscal behaviour to
growth. For example, Gang and Khan (1991) and Franco-Rodriquez et al. (1998)
estimate only the fiscal response model. Mosley et al (1987), in contrast, use fiscal
response theory to derive an equation relating aid to growth, but then only estimate the
aid-growth relationship (using cross-country regressions). In principle, there is no
reason not to include both approaches in one study, and such models offer a mechanism
through which to explore how policy is conditional on aid. In practice, however, it
would be a challenging exercise and very demanding of the data.
3.2 Policy implications
Fiscal response models can enhance our understanding of the way in which aid
influences government behaviour, especially by highlighting the complex linkages and
variations by country. Aid may increase investment (relative to what might otherwise
have been the case), especially if donors are able to constrain the ability of recipients to
reallocate aid to unintended consumption uses, i.e. to ensure that (11) is binding. If,
however, recipients are able to increase borrowing they may be able to allocate such
funds to consumption (which may be undesirable in terms of the overall impact on
growth). In this context, a finding that aid is associated with increased borrowing
becomes very important. Such a result does not reflect an estimated impact on
borrowing per se, but rather suggests that aid tends to be associated with an increasing
fiscal deficit (and the implied borrowing is mostly domestic).20
There are a number of possible explanations for why this may occur. The most obvious
is that the knowledge that a government is in receipt of aid allows it to increase
borrowing, as creditors perceive that it has the ability to service debts. Another
explanation is that certain aid expenditures require matching spending by the recipient
(and this is likely to appear as recurrent spending). This is consistent with the evidence
that total spending increases by more than the value of aid (and is also consistent with
consumption spending rising). If spending rises by more than revenues (assuming
constant tax effort), the deficit will rise and borrowing is implied. If tax effort is
reduced, the need for borrowing may be greater. Another explanation is that spending
officials may misperceive their budget constraint, the aid illusion referred to above
(McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000b), which, especially in an environment of poor
public expenditure management, can induce excess spending. The important policy
implication can be expressed in simple terms. Even if recipient governments do not
have ‘malicious’ intentions, aid can be associated with expenditure increases in excess
of the aid itself, and this may lead to the need for borrowing to finance the deficit. As
recognised in World Bank (1998, chapter 4) and elaborated in Fozzard and Foster
(2000), the system of public expenditure management is central to the fiscal effects of
aid.
The contrary finding, that aid is associated with reductions in domestic borrowing, is
equally important and may be evidence of effective conditionality. Donor conditions on
macroeconomic management often include measures to reduce domestic borrowing, and
to reduce the fiscal deficit. In situations where it is difficult to raise tax revenue, these
objectives can conflict. This would be signalled, in fiscal response models, by the
finding that borrowing increases (as discussed above). Aid associated with reduced
borrowing is suggestive of improved fiscal discipline. If tax revenue is increased, total
spending may increase by at least the value of the aid. If tax revenue is not increased,
the adjustment must be borne by spending. Total spending will increase by less than the
aid, and it is likely that some fungibility will be observed.
How to interpret the effect of aid on tax effort is more ambiguous. The logic of fiscal
response models is that it is undesirable that aid encourage reduced tax effort, as less
funds are available for net additional investment. The underlying intention is that aid is
a net addition to government revenues, so that aid can be a net addition to investment
(or consumption where appropriate). Fiscal response shows how this additional effect
can be diluted. If taxes are interpreted as a measure of distortion, as in some growth
theories, lower taxes would appear beneficial. Such reasoning is erroneous: growth
theory is concerned with the distortionary effects of tax revenue, rather than the amount
of revenue collected, i.e. the tax/GDP ratio is a poor proxy for government distortions
(see Gemmell, 2000; Heady, 2000). In this sense, fiscal response analysis complements
growth theory by permitting a more informed interpretation of government behaviour.
Developing countries, especially the poorer aid-dependent ones, have traditionally been
heavily reliant on trade taxes, arguably the most distortionary of taxes (Greenaway and
Milner, 1991). Liberalisation of trade, notably reducing tariffs, has been a cornerstone
of economic policy reform associated with conditional aid since the 1980s (Greenaway
and Morrissey, 1993). Although countries can liberalise trade in a revenue neutral
manner, this would not uniformly be the case. It follows that conditional aid could well21
be associated with policy reforms that have the effect of reducing tax revenue (at least
during the adjustment period), and the aid may even be partly intended to compensate
for this revenue loss. In principle, fiscal response studies could address this by
considering the policy reforms implemented during the period of analysis (in practice
none have done so). Nevertheless, there is a policy implication: donors should take note
not only of the potential fiscal effects of aid, but also the fiscal implications of policy
reforms associated with conditional aid.
Notwithstanding these ambiguities, fiscal response models offer important insights into
how the impact of aid on growth is mediated by the response of government to aid
receipts. When the results of such models are contrasted with those of fungibility, a
number of implications emerge. First, and foremost, the final outcome in terms of total
spending, and its allocation, is quite different when one solves the system of fiscal
interactions compared to when one looks at the partial, contemporaneous relationship.
Second, and elaborating on this, aid does have effects on tax effort and borrowing, and
the interaction of these determines the ultimate effect on total spending. Fungibility
studies miss this important potential effect of aid. In summary, other things being equal
(such as private savings, human capital and macroeconomic policy as identified from
growth theory), aid is more likely to be growth-promoting if:
— Aid intended for investment (in physical or human capital) ultimately increases
spending in those areas. This may arise because aid is actually allocated to
such investment uses, or because aid stimulates increases in other revenues.
— Aid receipts do not encourage reduced tax effort (interpreted independently of
how distortionary the tax system is). In general, the tax/GDP ratio is low in
aid-dependent economies, and a core feature of mobilizing domestic resources
is to increase that ratio. There may, of course, be disagreement on the optimal
level. Adam and Bevan (2000) suggest that there is a consensus that the
optimal tax/GDP ratio is 15-20%, although they do not consider if this is also
the optimal expenditure/GDP ratio.
— Aid receipts do not encourage the diversion of tax revenues to consumption
spending (subject to the proviso that pro-poor consumption spending may be a
policy objective in its own right).
— Aid receipts do not encourage increased borrowing to finance consumption. If
borrowing is used to finance productive investment, then in principle there is
no reason to be concerned if aid induces increased borrowing. Furthermore, in
this case, one may be less concerned to observe that aid is redirected to
consumption.
The value of fiscal response models is that they permit one to trace through these
linkages. In this sense they are more informative regarding the effects of aid on
government fiscal behaviour than are fungibility studies (as the latter are really only
concerned with the allocation of expenditure). Further refinement and development of
fiscal response models is warranted. In particular, to date the potential impact of aid on
borrowing (a possibility that fiscal response modeling deserves credit for highlighting)
has not been explored in any detail, nor have subsequent effects on fiscal behaviour.
Another issue, discussed in the final section, is regarding the definition of consumption22
spending, or equivalently of distinctions between developmental and non-
developmental spending. In many studies the definitions are imprecise, and the
treatment of spending on health and education is often problematic. This represents a
criticism of fungibility studies that tend to assert that ‘consumption’ spending is not
intended to be supported by aid, whereas in fact it often is (and increasingly so as
donors attach more emphasis to health and education). Furthermore, one of the major
elements of government recurrent (consumption) spending is interest payments (debt
servicing). It may often be intended, implicitly if not explicitly, that aid can be used for
this purpose. This may help explain many of the results in fungibility studies. However,
if aid increases borrowing, and indeed if the aid itself is debt-creating, this has future
implications for interest payments (there may be a positive effect if the need for
borrowing encourages the development of deeper domestic financial markets).
4. Other issues and conclusions
The focus of this review has been on how governments respond to aid, or how aid
impacts on government fiscal behaviour (taxing, spending and borrowing decisions). As
described in the previous two sections, research in this area has tended to concentrate on
either fungibility (a rather narrow concern with the composition of spending) or fiscal
response (that, warts and all, attempts to address the broader dimension). Whilst other
studies (for reviews see Adam and Bevan, 2000; Gemmell, 2000; Heady, 2000) have
considered fiscal policy and fiscal structure, especially tax structure, these have rarely
had any specific concern with aid. In fact, excepting the literature reviewed here, there
have been remarkably few attempts to study specifically the links between aid and fiscal
behaviour in developing countries.
4.1 Miscellaneous issues
CGE modeling is a commonly used technique to analyze the effects of tax policy and
structure (e.g. Levin, 2000; Perry et al., 2000), but it has rarely been employed to
address the impacts of aid. Collier and Gunning (1992) use a prototype CGE model to
simulate the interactions between trade liberalization and aid receipts in terms of their
effects on relative prices of tradables and non-tradables. This is an example of aid and
policy inter-relatedness. An innovative approach is to use a stylized general equilibrium
model of the economy with government, subsistence and one or more productive
sectors, and then demonstrate how aid to particular sectors and/or in the form of capital
goods can alter relative prices (Hansson, 1995; Falck, 1997). All of these studies are
trying to explore effects of aid on relative prices, for which the essentially structural
CGE framework is appropriate. The CGE approach, however, is not so well suited to
exploring how aid may alter government behaviour, as the (assumed) behavioural
relationship is incorporated in the structure of the model. This is one reason why it has
not been employed to examine the fiscal impacts of aid. One could, in principle, use a
CGE model to estimate the tax revenue implications of aid, where aid is an input to
sectors either in the form of investment or demand (consumption spending). We are not
aware of any studies that have attempted this.23
There is, however, a broader dimension regarding the impact of aid on behaviour—the
issue of conditionality, structural adjustment and the use of aid for policy leverage.
Conditional lending, specifically through structural adjustment loans, became the
standard of donor aid policy in the 1980s. The motivation was to use aid as leverage to
entice, cajole or encourage recipients to implement the types of economic policy
reforms that the donors believed were necessary and essential to stabilize the economy
and establish the foundations for sustained growth. Early evaluations of adjustment
loans were critical (see McGillivray and Morrissey, 1999), and it proved easy to
demonstrate that conditional lending could not be an effective way to ensure policy
reform (White and Morrissey, 1997).
This does not, and should not, imply that conditional lending has no effects. Rather,
what researchers have shown is that conditional lending per se is not an effective
instrument for ensuring relatively rapid policy reform. Perhaps these evaluations were
too strict—evaluating implementation on fairly narrowly defined measures within a
short time horizon (typically, the period of the relevant conditional loan) rather than
taking a step back and considering the level of reforms attempted over a longer time
frame. Economic reform, especially if it should be complemented by institutional and
political reform, is an inherently slow process (Morrissey, 1999). There are few cases
where reform was implemented quickly and dramatically (the ‘big bang’ approach), and
these cases were almost all failures. A gradual implementation is the most common
case, largely because reform is politically difficult, even if governments are convinced
of the economic arguments (Morrissey, 1999). This is not the place to review that
literature, but we will make some points regarding trade policy reform in sub-Saharan
Africa (SSA), chosen because the principal reforms had potential tax revenue impacts.
Rationalisation and reduction of tariffs may be revenue-reducing, but this can be of-set
by the tariffication of quantitative restrictions and by devaluation (which increases the
domestic currency price of imports).
Few SSA countries implemented significant trade reforms in the 1980s, the period when
they were in receipt of conditional loans ‘demanding’ reform, but by the late 1990s
significant trade policy reform had been achieved in many countries, often some ten
years after the onset of conditional lending (Morrissey, 2001). A number of countries
have achieved a significant and sustained degree of trade liberalisation, notably Ghana,
Mauritius and Uganda, with Madagascar and Tanzania to a lesser extent. These
countries reduced tariffs significantly, although the evidence on the impact on collected
tariff revenues is mixed. It is plausible to argue that aid exerted policy leverage in
encouraging trade reforms. These had a direct fiscal impact in that the degree of
distortion associated with the (import) tax regime was significantly reduced, and may
not have adversely impacted on tax revenue. To the extent that aid conditionality has
policy leverage, and it appears to have (even if it is a slow process), this represents
another dimension of the impact of aid on fiscal policy. It is beyond the remit of this
paper.
Some authors have attributed aid ineffectiveness to fungibility as aid funds are
redirected from investment to public consumption. There are two elements to this
argument. The first is that there is fungibility and, specifically, investment spending
increases by less than the amount of the aid. The evidence for this is strong if one limits24
attention to categorical fungibility studies (World Bank, 1998) but much weaker if one
considers evidence from broader fiscal response models (above). The second argument
is that public consumption spending impacts negatively on growth (e.g. Burnside and
Dollar, 1997). The evidence in this regard is not compelling. Results vary according to
sample, analytical method and categorisation of public expenditures. In the latter regard
the distinction usually made is between productive (investment) expenditures and non-
productive (consumption) spending, with the assumption that only the former is growth-
promoting. How these are actually measured (especially the treatment of spending on
human capital) varies from study to study (see Gemmell, 2000).
The empirical evidence is mixed. Barro (1991) and Landau (1983, 1986) concluded that
public consumption spending is negatively related to growth (although this result is not
consistently found for the poorest countries). On the other hand, Ram (1986) and
Grossman (1988) found a positive relationship between government spending and
economic growth, regardless of the disaggregation of expenditures. Diamond (1989)
argued that social expenditure exhibited a positive impact on growth in the short-run but
capital expenditure had a negative effect on growth. Lin (1994) found that non-
productive spending had an insignificant impact on growth for industrialized countries
but a significant positive impact for developing countries. These are all cross-section
studies. In the one time series study of a developing country that we are aware of,
Kweka and Morrissey (2000) found that government consumption spending (excluding
health and education) was positively related to growth in Tanzania, whereas public
investment was negatively (or insignificantly) related to growth. This is quite a robust
result in the study, the interpretation being that public investment was non-productive
whereas consumption spending supported incomes (this could be generally applicable to
poor countries, where the public sector is a major source of formal incomes, especially
in post-conflict situations). While the evidence may be mixed, one certainly cannot
generalize to claim that government consumption spending is growth-retarding in the
poorest countries. This undermines the reasons to be concerned about fungibility insofar
as many studies in that literature implicitly assume that consumption spending is
growth-retarding.
4.2 Conclusions
Growth theory helps to identify a number of positive features that aid should have to be
effective. Aid should increase savings and productive investment, and it should support
human capital and technology transfer such that factor productivity increases. The
recent literature is also agreed that government policy is an important determinant of the
impact of aid on growth. Less attention, however, is paid to how aid can itself influence
policy. This paper addressed one aspect of this – how aid affects fiscal policy or, more
accurately, fiscal behaviour. We argued that fungibility studies can be misleading. They
focus narrowly on a partial, static analysis of the composition of spending, often making
the empirically questionable assumption that government consumption spending has a
negative impact on growth whereas investment spending has a positive impact when
drawing policy implications.25
Fiscal response models identify how aid may induce government behaviour that
undermines or enhances the positive impact of aid. Aid may be diverted to non-
productive uses, it may discourage tax effort or encourage increased borrowing.
Alternatively, aid may increase tax effort, encourage increased spending on investment
and development areas, and support improved fiscal management so reducing
borrowing. In the light of the findings from these studies, we can return to the questions
posed in the introduction.
Is aid used for the purposes for which donors provided it? Not necessarily, and in any
given year expenditure on items to which donors allocate aid may not increase by the
amount of the aid. But this is not the right question. Rather, does aid lead to an increase
over time in expenditures that promote growth and poverty-reduction? As this question
has not specifically been asked of the data, and one may be unsure what such
expenditures actually are (see McKay, 2000), the strict answer is that we do not know.
On balance, there is evidence for a positive answer, but this is an issue to pursue.
What are the effects of aid on various categories of public sector expenditure, including
investment (fixed and human) and consumption? Here there is more evidence. In
general, aid tends to increase total spending by more than the amount of the aid. How
this is allocated across different categories varies from country to country but, in
principal, all categories of expenditure can increase. Furthermore, what is classed as
consumption spending may be growth-promoting.
What are the effects of aid on revenue and financing decisions, including those relating
to taxation and borrowing? The evidence here is decidedly mixed and there are only
robust results for three countries. In Costa Rica, aid appears to have been associated
with increased tax effort and reduced borrowing. In Pakistan, the reverse was the case.
In the Philippines the net effects were quite small, but aid was associated with reduced
borrowing. Nevertheless, the research highlights that aid can have significant effects on
tax effort and borrowing needs, and these possibilities should be recognized.
Does aid cause reductions in public sector saving, and hence prolong a dependence on
external financing? The fiscal response literature suggests the possibility that aid can be
associated with increased borrowing. This is an important finding, and an issue not
recognized in World Bank (1998), that warrants further research. On balance, however,
there is no convincing evidence that aid promotes dependence on external financing.
What lessons can be drawn from these results regarding aid policy and the broader
impacts on growth and poverty alleviation? We draw three conclusions. First, insofar as
in response to aid government spending increases (and by more than the amount of aid),
aid contributes to growth. The evidence is inconclusive regarding the growth impact of
different categories of public spending. As a consequence, fungibility studies are largely
irrelevant in this regard. Aid effectiveness may be even greater if aid provides leverage
to promote policy reform, as appears to be the case (albeit a gradual process). Second,
the downside is that the impact of aid on fiscal aggregates may increase the fiscal
deficit, implying a need for increased borrowing, which may be a future burden that
could constrain growth. This requires further research.26
Third, and finally, the evidence reviewed here is not informative regarding the impact of
aid on poverty reduction. Partly, this is because poverty reduction cannot clearly be
linked to specific expenditures or fiscal policies. Partly, it is because the evidence is
based on ‘retrospective’ studies when poverty reduction was not an explicit policy
objective. In simple terms, researchers were not trying to identify the effect on poverty.
Future studies may wish to address this issue. In fact, there is something incongruous
about the emphasis on aid for poverty reduction and the discussion of fungibility in
World Bank (1998) and related studies. The aid-growth link is predicated on aid being
used for investment, yet pro-poor expenditures are likely to include many categories of
consumption spending and Poverty Action Funds are targeted on what would be defined
as consumption spending. The categorical fungibility studies would suggest that donors
are unable to accurately target aid on, for example, health or education. To some extent
this argument is exaggerated—donors can ensure that spending in certain areas does
increase, even if not by the full amount of the aid. Our principal point is that it is more
important to consider the long-term relationship between aid and the fiscal policy
aggregates. This is especially true in the context of aid effectiveness, but is also relevant
to the contribution of aid to poverty reduction.
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